Competition Quarterly Milestones (July-September 2026)

The Competition Commission of India (CCI), through two orders dated 13 July 2026, found HP India Sales Private Limited (HP India) and several of its resellers to have engaged in bid-rigging in Government e-Marketplace (GeM) tenders for: (a) personal systems products; and (b) supplies products such as ink and toner cartridges.¹ The CCI imposed monetary penalties on HP India to the tune of INR 126.87 crore (USD 13.1 million) in the personal systems products case and INR 11.98 crore (USD 1.2 million) in the supplies products case, along with separate penalties on the resellers and certain individuals involved.

The CCI found that HP India coordinated bidding among resellers by exchanging bid-price information, directing pricing decisions, monitoring discounts, intervening when resellers undercut one another, and facilitating cover bids. It also found that HP India selectively issued manufacturer authorisation forms to influence tender outcomes and protect incumbent resellers serving Most Valuable Customer (MVC) accounts. While the personal systems case resulted in penalties on HP India and five resellers, the supplies products case involved a broader collusive arrangement to protect MVC accounts, resulting in liability for HP India and all 16 reseller entities.

Key findings and takeaways:

• OEMs and resellers may be treated as horizontal competitors in tenders: Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) and their resellers may be considered horizontal competitors when they participate in the same tender. Coordination between them may therefore constitute bid-rigging under the Competition Act, 2002 (as amended) (Competition Act), despite their broader vertical relationship.
• Cooperation with the CCI does not guarantee complete immunity: Although HP India applied for lesser penalty in both cases, the CCI declined to grant it complete immunity in view of its central role in the collusive arrangements. This underscores that cooperation with the CCI does not necessarily eliminate liability or ensure the highest level of leniency.
• Competition compliance remains critical: The CCI directed the parties to conduct competition law compliance training and submit compliance reports. The orders highlight the CCI’s increasing focus on preventive compliance measures alongside enforcement.

The CCI, by an order dated 8 September 2026, imposed a penalty of INR 15 lakh (USD 15,500) on Lloyds Metals and Energy Limited (LMEL) for gun-jumping, i.e., giving effect to part of a proposed combination before receiving CCI approval.²

The issue arose because LMEL had provided a corporate guarantee for debentures issued by an entity controlled by a promoter of Thriveni Earthmovers Private Limited (the seller of the mining business being acquired) before receiving CCI approval for the transaction. LMEL contended that the guarantee was merely a temporary credit-support arrangement backed by a counter-guarantee and did not amount to implementation of the transaction.

The CCI rejected this argument, finding that the arrangement, in substance, enabled prepayment of consideration. It reiterated that standstill obligations under the Competition Act require the parties to preserve independence pending regulatory approval. The reversibility of an arrangement or the absence of financial risk to the acquirer does not, by itself, prevent it from constituting gun-jumping.

The order reaffirms the CCI’s substance-over-form approach to gun-jumping. Interim funding, guarantees and other pre-closing arrangements may attract scrutiny where they effectively facilitate payment of consideration before approval. Parties should therefore assess such arrangements against the standstill obligations before implementing them, irrespective of their stated purpose or contractual safeguards.

The CCI, by its order dated 21 August 2026, partly accepted the reference filed by the State of Haryana concerning alleged cartelisation in the procurement of tyres by State Transport Undertakings (STU), but found contravention only in relation to a separate Himachal Pradesh tender.³

The order distinguishes between suspicious tender outcomes or bidding patterns and evidence sufficient to establish collusion. While the CCI found the authorised representatives of tyre manufacturers J.K. Tyre and CEAT liable for bid-rigging, it did not find sufficient evidence to establish the liability of the tyre manufacturers. The order highlights the CCI’s continued scrutiny of pre-bid exchanges of commercially sensitive pricing information, including where such exchanges occur through bidding intermediaries.

Key findings:

• Suspicious bidding patterns do not, by themselves, establish cartelisation: Sole participation in a tender or a substantial increase in bid prices is insufficient to establish cartelisation under the Competition Act without evidence of coordination between the bidders.

• Liability must be supported by evidence linking the parties’ principals to the collusive conduct: The CCI declined to attribute the conduct of authorised representatives to J.K. Tyre and CEAT, finding no evidence that the manufacturers had authorised, participated in, or were aware of the impugned communications. Penalties and cease-and-desist directions were therefore confined to the authorised representatives and the individuals involved.

The CCI, by its order dated 9 September 2026, closed the information filed by Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC) against West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company Limited (WBSEDCL), alleging predatory pricing, discriminatory pricing and leveraging in electricity distribution in the DVC Command Area in West Bengal.⁴ The CCI defined the relevant market as the market for distribution of electricity in the DVC Command Area in the State of West Bengal.

The CCI held that WBSEDCL was not dominant in the relevant market, noting that DVC remained the biggest distribution licensee and that multiple licensees operated in the area. It also found no prima facie case of predatory pricing or discriminatory pricing. The CCI observed that the competitive tariff regime operated within the applicable regulatory framework and that consumer migration, by itself, did not amount to denial of market access or leveraging by WBSEDCL.

The CCI, by its order dated 8 September 2026, recalled its prima facie order directing an investigation by the Director General and closed the proceedings initiated on an information filed by WinZO Games Private Limited (WinZO) against Google LLC & Ors. (collectively Google).⁵ The information alleged anti-competitive conduct arising from the selective treatment of real-money gaming apps.

WinZO had sought to withdraw its information following the enactment of the Promotion and Regulation of Online Gaming Act, 2025 (Online Gaming Act) in August 2025. However, the CCI noted that competition proceedings are in rem and do not depend on the continued participation of the informant. It still recalled its earlier order and closed the matter in light of the changed regulatory framework, i.e., the notification of the Online Gaming Act.

This order illustrates how a material change in the applicable regulatory framework may affect ongoing competition proceedings, where the change removes or fundamentally alters the market conditions underlying the alleged anti-competitive conduct.

The CCI, by its order dated 16 July 2026, closed the information against Airports Authority of India (AAI), the Ministry of Civil Aviation and Delhi International Airport Limited (DIAL) concerning the award of security service contracts at Indira Gandhi International Airport (IGIA).⁶ The information alleged abuse of dominant position in connection with DIAL’s award of the contract to RAXA, a related entity which is a subsidiary of GMR.

DIAL submitted that the contracts had been awarded through a competitive bidding process and that the applicable safeguards under the Operation, Management and Development Agreement (OMDA) had been followed, including oversight for related-party contracts through AAI review, board approval and an independent probity auditor. The CCI accepted this explanation and found that the material on record showed compliance with the OMDA and an arm’s-length award process. This order shows that the award of a contract to a related party does not, by itself, establish abuse of dominance. It also emphasises that the CCI will not interfere with procurement decisions absent a clear competition concern. This, in turn, highlights the relevance of transparent procurement processes and appropriate governance safeguards in addressing competition concerns arising from related-party transactions.

The CCI issued public notices inviting comments on the commitment applications filed by InterGlobe Aviation Limited (IndiGo) and PVR INOX Limited (PVR). The applications provide an early illustration of the operation of the CCI’s commitment framework in abuse of dominance proceedings. They also demonstrate the CCI’s use of public consultation as a mechanism to test proposed behavioural commitments before determining whether to accept them.

The CCI notified the Competition Commission of India (Commitment) Amendment Regulations, 2026⁹ on 18 August 2026. The amendments largely reflect the draft changes circulated for stakeholder comments on 29 May 2026, which were discussed in our previous quarterly milestones, accessible here.