In this update:
Partner: Tanmay Patnaik, Counsel: Raj Chheda, Associate: Eisha Singh
In a significant development in passive euthanasia law in India, the Supreme Court, in Harish Rana v Union of India & Ors.,1 addressed the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment for a patient who had been in a Permanent Vegetative State (PVS) for 13 years following a severe brain injury. The patient survived solely on Clinically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration (CANH). His parents’ plea to withdraw this CANH was refused by the Delhi High Court.
The legality of withdrawing life-saving medical treatment, i.e., passive euthanasia, was laid down in Aruna Shanbaug v Union of India2 and later clarified in Common Cause v Union of India,3 where the Supreme Court held that the withdrawal of life-saving medical treatment is permitted only in cases where the patient is in a persistent vegetative state and has no hope of recovery, as determined by medical boards specifically constituted for such purpose. The primary issues in the current case were (i) whether CANH constitutes “medical treatment” (thereby bringing it within the ambit of life-saving medical treatment that may be withdrawn); and (ii) how the “best interest of the patient” principle applies when determining if such treatment should be withdrawn.
The Supreme Court allowed the withdrawal of CANH, ruling that CANH is a technologically mediated medical treatment, not merely basic care. Reinforcing the guidelines laid down in Common Cause, the Court held that withdrawing CANH to allow natural death (passive euthanasia) is constitutionally permissible under Article 21(Right to life), distinguishing it from active euthanasia, which involves introducing an external agency to cause death and remains a penal offence.
The judgment offers several crucial insights:
The Delhi High Court in Padmaja Kumari Parmar v Lakshyaraj Singh Mewar & Ors.,4 examined competing petitions concerning the estate of the late Arvind Singh Mewar, a member of the royal family of Mewar, Rajasthan. The deceased’s daughter filed a petition for Letters of Administration5 (LoA) on the premise of intestacy (i.e., where the deceased individual had not executed a valid Will), acknowledging the existence of an alleged Will but disputing its validity due to the testator’s alleged mental incapacity. Concurrently, the deceased’s son filed a petition for LoA annexing the disputed Will, claiming exclusive rights to the entire estate as the sole legatee.
The core issue before the Court was whether a petition for LoA on the ground of intestacy is maintainable when a parallel proceeding alleging the existence of a valid Will is already pending. The Court dismissed the intestacy petition, ruling that the validity, due execution, and genuineness of a Will must be exclusively adjudicated in proceedings where the Will is alleged. If a Will is alleged to exist, its validity cannot be proved or disproved in parallel proceedings for intestate succession.
This case highlights the high potential for aggrieved relatives to disrupt intestacy proceedings by producing a Will, whether real or fabricated. Similarly, probate or LoA proceedings in respect of genuine Wills may also be disrupted by the production of fabricated Wills. To ensure evidentiary propriety and mitigate such risks, testators should obtain appropriate medical certificates attesting to their mental competency at the time of execution and have the execution of the Will photographed or video-graphed.
In VS Trust v Income-tax Officer,6 the Chennai Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) examined the applicability of deemed gift tax provisions under the erstwhile Section 56(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (Old IT Act), now replaced by Section 92(2)(m) of the Income-tax Act, 2025.
The assessee, a private discretionary trust settled to benefit the settlor’s family, received shares worth approximately INR 15.78 crore during Assessment Year (AY) 2022–23 and claimed the exemption from deemed gift tax provisions available to trusts established solely for the benefit of the settlor’s specified relatives.
The Assessing Officer and Commissioner (Appeals) denied the exemption on two grounds. First, the original trust deed allowed trustees to add “entities” controlled by the settlor’s relatives as beneficiaries, creating the possibility of indirect benefit to non-relatives (such as minority shareholders of such entities). Second, that a supplemental deed, executed a year later to amend this clause, was invalid, as the amendment clause in the original deed prohibited altering the primary objects of the trust.
The assessee submitted that the tax authorities erroneously relied on a deleted clause. The supplemental deed, made retrospectively effective from the trust’s inception, replaced the original clause and restricted the trustees’ powers to reclassify or remove beneficiaries. The assessee further contended that the amendment was valid as it did not alter fundamental objects of the trust but reinforced its intent to benefit only specified relatives.
The ITAT ruled in favour of the assessee, upholding the validity of the amendment, noting the operative deed eliminated any possibility of non-relatives benefiting. Accordingly, the trust qualified for exemption under Section 56(2)(x) of the Old IT Act, and the addition of INR 15.78 crore was deleted.
The outcome in this case turned on the timing and validity of the amendment. In contrast, in Buckeye Trust,7 a similar amendment was rejected by the Bengaluru Bench of ITAT, as it was introduced only after the defect had been identified during tax proceedings. In VS Trust, however, the amendment was treated as integral to the trust framework from inception.
These rulings reflect an increasingly stringent approach by tax authorities, focusing not only on the actual class of beneficiaries in a given year but also on the potential scope of trustee powers under the trust deed. The mere presence of a power to introduce non-relatives, whether directly or indirectly, may be sufficient to deny a tax exemption. In this context, settlors and advisors must ensure beneficiary definitions and trustee powers are tightly drafted at the outset, with no residual flexibility that could be construed as potentially permitting benefit to non-relatives. Existing trust structures may also warrant review to assess and mitigate any such exposure.
[1] 2026 INSC 222
[2] (2011) 4 SCC 454
[3] (2018) 5 SCC 1; (2023) 14 SCC 131
[4] TEST.CAS. 2/2026 & I.A. 1453/2026, I.A. 1961/2026
[5] Letters of Administration are judicial decrees entitling the recipient to administer the estate of the deceased and establishing the rights to the inheritance of the estate of the deceased in favour of the legal heirs.
[6] [2026] 182 taxmann.com 842 (Chennai – Trib.)
[7] Buckeye Trust v Principal Commissioner of Income-tax, [2026] 183 taxmann.com 381 (Bangalore – Trib)
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