Competition Quarterly Milestones (January-March 2026)

By an order dated 12 March 2026, the Competition Commission of India (CCI), closed an abuse of dominance inquiry against Big Tree Entertainment Private Limited (BookMyShow) under the Competition Act, 2002 (Competition Act).¹

The information was filed by Showtyme, a newly-launched competing online ticketing platform, alleging that BookMyShow engaged in exclusionary and discriminatory practices. The allegations included the imposition of exclusivity on cinemas, provision of zero-interest monetary deposits that creates lock-in, charging exorbitant convenience fees, and discriminatory revenue and customer data sharing, resulting in denial of market access.

In its investigation, the Director General, CCI (DG) defined the relevant market as “online intermediation services for booking of movie tickets in India” and found that BookMyShow held a dominant position. The DG concluded that BookMyShow had abused its dominance through exclusive contracts, seat inventory reservations, discriminatory data sharing, and unequal revenue-sharing arrangements.

The CCI agreed with the DG on the finding of dominant position. However, it rejected all the findings of abuse and accepted the business and objective justifications provided by BookMyShow. The key findings of the CCI were:

The CCI reiterated that liability under the Competition Act arises only where conduct is abusive and causally linked to anti-competitive effects. It clarified that differential treatment is not per se discriminatory, and exclusivity and lock-ins may be permissible where they are proportionate to the investments made, signalling a more nuanced, effect-based approach to abuse of dominance cases in India.

By an order dated 12 February 2026, the CCI held that Intel Corporation (Intel) abused its dominant position in the market for “boxed microprocessors for desktop PCs in India” (BMP Market).² The CCI imposed a penalty of INR 27.38 crore and directed Intel to publicise the withdrawal of the impugned warranty policy.

The dispute arose from Intel’s 2016 ‘India Specific Warranty Policy’ (Warranty Policy), under which warranty claims in India were honoured only if the boxed microprocessors (BMP) were purchased from authorised Indian distributors. Consequently, BMPs purchased from authorised distributors outside India, though technically covered by warranty, were denied warranty service within India.

Based on Intel’s consistently high market share, both in volume and value, the CCI found that it held a dominant position in the BMP Market. The CCI also noted that Intel’s vast size and resources confer it with a significant competitive advantage over its primary competitor, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (AMD).

Having established dominance, the CCI held that Intel’s Warranty Policy amounted to abuse of dominance on the following three grounds:

Intel voluntarily withdrew the policy in April 2024, but the CCI nevertheless imposed a penalty. Although the policy withdrawal was treated as a mitigating factor, given that the violation had persisted for eight years, the CCI concluded that it still warranted a financial penalty. The decision highlights that dominant enterprises must ensure consistency in the commercial terms, including post-sale support policies, thereby reinforcing broader competition law compliance obligations to prevent market distortion or the disadvantaging of parallel trade.

By an order dated 8 January 2026, the CCI imposed a penalty of INR 50 lakh on Allcargo Logistics Limited (Allcargo) for its failure to notify the acquisition of a 30% stake in Gati-Kintetsu Express Private Limited (Gati Express).³

The CCI observed that prior to the transaction, Allcargo indirectly held a 70% stake in Gati Express, while the sellers held a 30% stake and had veto rights over special resolutions, amounting to negative control. Consequently, the pre-transaction structure constituted joint control. The impugned transaction resulted in Allcargo acquiring the remaining 30% stake, transitioning from ‘joint control’ to ‘sole control’ over Gati Express.

Allcargo contended that it already exercised decisive control and that the acquisition qualified for exemption under Item 2 of Schedule I of the Competition Commission of India (Procedure in relation to the transaction of business relating to combinations) Regulations, 2011 (the erstwhile regulations governing combinations, prior to their replacement by the Competition Commission of India (Combinations) Regulations, 2024).

The CCI rejected this argument and held that a shift from joint control to sole control constitutes a change in control, which disqualifies the transaction from the benefit of the Item 2 exemption, which is available only where there is no change in control.

This order reiterates CCI’s strict approach to gun-jumping and reaffirms that parties must carefully assess changes in control, even within existing shareholding structures and operational dynamics. Under Indian competition law, ‘control’ is a matter of degree, and all degrees and forms of control, namely, positive control, negative control, sole control, and joint control, constitute ‘control.’

By an order dated 21 October 2025, subsequently published in February 2026, the CCI approved the proposed acquisition of J.B. Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals Limited (JBCPL) by Torrent Pharmaceuticals Limited (TPL), subject to voluntary modifications.⁴ The CCI identified prima facie competition concerns in three finished dosage form markets arising from the parties’ high combined market shares. These concerns were addressed through a hybrid package of structural and behavioural commitments, proposed by TPL and accepted by the CCI, as set out below:

Although the combined market shares of TPL and JBCPL were high in both the Lactobacillus Acidophilus and Nifedipine markets, the CCI considered a structural remedy necessary only in the Nifedipine market, given the differing operational dynamics of both markets.

This acquisition approval highlights the CCI’s evolving and flexible approach to merger remedies. By combining structural divestiture with targeted behavioural commitments, the CCI has signalled a reasoned, market-specific framework for addressing competition concerns, particularly in complex, product-segmented industries like pharmaceuticals.

By an order dated 23 February 2026, the Delhi High Court dismissed a writ petition filed by International Flavors & Fragrances (IFF) challenging the CCI’s order to investigate alleged labour market co-ordination among IFF and two other fragrance manufacturers.⁵ The CCI had directed the DG to investigate potential anti-competitive conduct involving Givaudan, Firmenich, and IFF. The investigation was triggered by a leniency application filed in the aftermath of the 2023 global dawn raids concerning alleged no-poach and related labour-market coordination/anti-competitive arrangements.

IFF challenged the investigation order primarily on the grounds of limitation. The Delhi High Court rejected this contention, holding that the CCI had duly considered the limitation provision and condoned the delay upon demonstration of ‘sufficient cause.’ Accordingly, the Delhi High Court concluded that there were no grounds to interdict the CCI’s investigation order.

This case highlights judicial deference to the CCI’s investigative powers at the prima facie stage, reinforcing its procedural discretion. This marks one of the first instances of the CCI formally investigating labour market coordination as a potential cartel, further expanding CCI’s focus on cartel investigations in India. Antitrust investigations into similar conduct involving the same entities are reportedly underway in jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom, the European Union, and Switzerland, indicating increasing global scrutiny of labour market restraints.